That may be true, but in the period leading to the August Olympic Games, the Central Propaganda Department's censorship machine is running at the higher level it uses to control news flow during critical party congresses and national legislative assemblies, when the government wants to stifle all criticism. And even though there has been a flurry of releases earlier this year, China continues to hold 24 journalists behind bars, the largest number of any country in the world. Since China was awarded the Olympics on July 13 2001, at least 37 journalists have been imprisoned for their work, and 16 of those 37 remain there. But the jailing of journalists in China does not tell the entire story. The vast majority are not in jail, and operate with in a system of well defined limits, set by the Central Propaganda Department -- which was renamed in 1998, in English only, as the Central Publicity Department.

Though the Chinese constitution protects freedom of the press, speech, and expression, there are institutional barriers to the free distribution of news in China. All news outlets must be authorized by the State Council and must comply with specific regulations guarding almost every aspect of operation: hiring and training practices, the amount of their registered capital, where they are located, ties to any sponsoring state agency, and number of their news bureaus.

The CPD's regulations for broadcast, print, and Internet news outlets list broad categories of unacceptable content, including anything that "disrupts the social order or undermines social stability" or is "detrimental to social morality or to the finer cultural traditions of the nation." Organizations that violate CPD regulations can be punished with fines or shutdowns. By law, all news outlets must be affiliated with a state entity, but the degree of direct party oversight, the level of financial pressure, and the influence of reporters and editors vary across regions and types of media. Print and Internet media tend to have more leeway than broadcasters. And, for example, authorities in Shanghai have a reputation for tolerating little political criticism from the city's media, while media in Guangzhou are aggressively commercial.

The CPD operates under the control of the Politburo Standing Committee, which gives it a great deal of authority. The CPD and its local branch offices monitor appointments of media managers and tell managers via telephone and email which issues to stress in reports and which topics to avoid. Groups of senior cadres working in "monthly evaluation small groups" critique news coverage seen as inaccurate or politically undesirable. News content is also monitored by papers' own employees. Their job is to keep their organizations from making political "mistakes." The CPD's hold on the media is further facilitated by collaboration with the General Administration of Press and Publications and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television. Both of them regularly issue regulations, reminders, and reprimands.

It is interesting to note that the daily directives, sometimes hourly, handed down from the Central Propaganda Department are no longer always delivered by e-mail anymore. Increasingly, directives are given by telephone, so that there is no electronic trail of the department's messages. We have been told that the method changed after our use of some of those messages appeared in "Falling Short," CPJ's report on the Olympics.

The penalties for editors and reporters crossing the censors' line are mostly administrative. Serious infractions are noted in their employment record. If a publication steps too far out of line, it may be shut down or see its staff "reorganized". These are not uncommon practices. Each year, several high profile publications disappear, or offending staff are demoted and shuttled off to publications where they can have less impact.

Within China's commercial press, the payment system for journalists is another method of content control. At most papers, reporters receive bonuses when their articles are published, and those bonuses make up the bulk of their income. The end result is that staff reporters are more likely to go after stories that will make it into print, or at least cover them in a way that will not offend the censors. Although there is tremendous competitive pressure to pursue stories that will grab readers, editors know that they cannot push the boundaries too often before they and their papers come under scrutiny.

Journalists who do go too far and are taken to trial are generally charged under the 1988 laws intended to guard state secrets. They provide a catchall basis for punishing any citizen for disseminating information deemed sensitive. Among the general categories it lists as secret are major policy decisions on state affairs, national defense and military issues, diplomatic activities, national economic and social development, science and technology, investigation into criminal offenses, and "other matters that are classified as state secrets by the state secret-guarding department." The State Secrecy Bureau can simply decree that given information is secret, even after it has entered the public domain.

The vague outlines of this law are the greatest stumbling block in efforts to build true watchdog journalism in China. As we have seen, for journalists the law is almost superfluous; there are enough social and administrative controls on online, broadcast, and print media to ensure that nothing very sensitive is leaked. Authorities use state secrets and security laws as a last resort to criminally prosecute journalists. The law carries its own particular barbs. It allows suspects to be held for months, or even years, without access to a lawyer. It allows extension after extension of pretrial detention. And it often brings steep jail terms.

Mo Shaoping, a veteran Beijing-based lawyer who has represented many jailed journalists, told CPJ earlier this month that "there has been no reduction in cases where subversion charges are brought against people for articles they have written. If anything," Mr Mo told us, "these cases have increased in the past one or two years."

It is clear that China's promises for a freer media in time for August's Games will not be fulfilled --Beijing and the International Olympic Committee have failed to follow through on the pledges they made to the world in 2001. And even though Chinese journalists have been abandoned by the IOC, we should make it clear to them that they still have the support of their colleagues as they attempt to expand the media universe in which they live and work. We should use the internationalist spirit of the Games to deliver that message to them in the coming months.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this morning.